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Research in cognitive science suggests that much of
cognition involves the rapid manipulation of complex
data structures. However, it is very unclear how this
could be realized in neural networks or connectionist
systems. A core question is: how could the inter-
connectivity of items in an abstract-level data struc-
ture be neurally encoded? My answer appeals mainly
to positional relationships between activity patterns
within neural arrays, rather than directly to neural
connections in the traditional way. The new method
was initially devised to account for abstract-symbolic
data structures, but it also supports cognitively use-
ful "spatial analogue", image-like representations. As
the neural model is based on massive, uniform, par-
allel computations over 2D arrays, the MPP is a con-
venient tool for simulation work, although there are
complications in using the machine to the fullest ad-
vantage. An MPP Pascal simulation program for a
small pilot version of the model is running.
Keywords: neural networks, connectionism, represen-
tation theory, data structures, mental models, im-
agery, spatial analogues.
I therefore adopt the working hypothesis that
much of human cognition requires rapid computa-
tional processes involving complex, temporary struc-
tures that hold information. These structures do not,
however, have to be very similar to the particular data
structures proposed in current AI and cognitive sci-
ence.
Now, in recent years there has been great inter-
est in the question of how "brain hardware" operates
so as to support cognitive functions. The usual as-
sumption is that the proper hardware level at which
to study cognitive functions is that of the dynamics of
neural networks, in which individual neurons perform
only quite low-level functions and communicate with
each other by sending simple signals along fibres. I
take this assumption as a second working hypothe-
sis, even though I am intrigued by suggestions that
other effects may be important; that, for instance, in-
dividual neurons may be capable of performing major
pieces of computation in their own right.
The two working hypotheses lead to the central
question addressed by the project:
INTRODUCTION
Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive Psychology have
provided the most advanced and detailed ideas about
the nature of the information processing needed
in cognition. Information processing as studied in
those fields typically involves the rapid manipula-
tion of complex, very-short-term symbolic data struc-
tures. The data structures may be representations of
the world, semantic structures derived from natural-
language utterances, descriptions of plans, goals, and
their relationships, and so on. Such structures must
be created, updated, analyzed, compared, modified,
committed to memory, and retrieved from memory
in rapid and complex ways. AI has been much con-
cerned with the abstract nature of the data structures
and manipulations, and with their implementation on
conventional computers.
CENTRAL QUESTION
How can rapidprocessingofcomplex, temporary
informationstructures,of some sortor other,be
accomplished by "standard" neuralnetcircuitry?
The emphasis on short-term structures and processing
is to be noted. The project is not at present concerned
with matters of long-term memory or learning. A late
stage of the project will look at such matters.
Limitations of Prevailing Ideas
Most of the research on the cognitive capabilities of
neural networks has centered on visual pattern recog-
nition, lexical processes in language understanding,
the "associative" retrieval of information from long-
term memory, and restricted forms of learning. But
for us to progress beyond these particular specialized
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functions, there must be a more" thorough and gen-
eral examination of how neural networks can repre-
sent and manipulate information. As is widely ad-
mitted, it is very unclear how we could answer the
Central Question by applying the main current ideas
about neural networks.
Most work on neural nets in AI and cognitive sci-
ence is within the so-called "connectionist" paradigm
[Refs. 4, 6, 8, II, 14]. Some connectionists have re-
cently begun to look at aspects of the central question
[e.g. Ref. 13]. However, the work is in its infancy and
has barely begun to address the real issues. There is
reason to believe [Ref. I] that it will be difficult to
deal with these issues without adding a great deal of
extra complication to existing connectionist models.
My own neural net model is a more thorough-
going attempt to confront the issues than has previ-
ously been made. In this confrontation, I have found
it beneficial to introduce some novel ideas about neu-
ral representation. The theory is thus highly atypical
as a connectionist theory if one defines connection-
ism by appeal to existing research, although it is still
connectionist in that it relies on networks of process-
ing units that are llke simplified neurons and send
only simple messages to each other. The model is
conjectural, though respectably in tune with neuro-
physiological evidence [Ref. 2]. An important feature
is that it serves as a brake on uncritical acceptance of
the (similarly conjectural) existing views of neural-net
functioning.
The Central Representational Tenets
Here I specify the basic, general representational prin-
ciples underlying the project. They could conceivably'
by instantiated in detail in numerous different ways.
One specific instantiation that I am studying and sim-
ulating will be outlined below. However, the general
principles would still be of interest even if this instan-
tiation were abandoned.
PRINCIPLE I
The neural realization (implementation) of a
short term data structure is composed of local-
ized patterns of neural activity. These localized
patterns are posilioned occurrences, in some neu-
ral medium, of patterns of neural activity that
are location-unspecific in that they can be in-
stantiated at any position within that medium.
Analogy: A piece of natural language text is a data
structure (in a paper/ink medium) whose parts are lo-
calized occurrences of location-unspecific visual pat-
terns (words).
pRINCIPLE
One important way in which those neural activity-
pattern occurrences are "glued" together so as to
form structures is to be in appropriate relative
positions in the neural medium.
Analogy: In a piece of text the word occurrences are
structured by being put into appropriate relative po-
sitions.
PRINCIPLE 3
Activity-pattern occurrences that act as parts of
an implemented data structure can also be asso-
ciated with each other by being similar in some
particular sense.
Analogy: a textual label used in a diagram and in a
legen_d attached to the diagram serves to associate a
part of the legend with a part of the diagram.
There is a fourth principle that I state later.
Neural Arrays
Principles 1 and 2 mentioned neural-net media in
which patterns of neural activity can be given in-
stantiations in particular positions. Thus, I am as-
suming that the media are such that one can make
sense of the notions of "instantiation', "position" and
"relative position" within a medium. To this end I
have adopted the following simple assumption in my
model: each medium is a £D square array of small
neural circuits. All the arrays are of the same size,
and all the small neural circuits (the array elements)
are similar to each other. Each array element sup-
ports at any given time a particular pattern of neural
activity, and, since the array elements are isomorphic
circuits, the supported patterns can be viewed as po-
sitioned instantiations of location-unspecific patterns.
A short-term data structure, then, consists at the
hardware level of configurations of pattern instantia-
tions in one or more of the neural arrays. To continue
the text or diagram analogies mentioned above, an ar-
ray can be likened to a piece of paper on which words
can be put in particular places.
In theory the arrayness of my neural media could
be purely abstract, with no implication that they are
laid out in space as geometric arrays. Nevertheless, I
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do in fact assume that they are so laid out, at least
approximately. This is convenient because the pro-
cessing applied to the media requires adjacent array
elements to communicate. Although there is some de-
gree of broadcasting within arrays, it is overshadowed
by the neighbor-neighbor interactions.
The 2D geometric arrayness of the media fits in
well with current ideas about the functional structure
of cortex. I say more on this later.
Spatial-Analogue Representation
Now that we have proposed an array-based compu-
tational architecture, it is a short step to the follow-
ing proposal: that bodies of information that can ab-
stractly be cast as arrays could in some cases be ira-'
plemented in the architecture by adopting a natural
mapping from the abstract arrays down to our neu-
ral arrays. (Cf. the standard implementation of a
1D abstract array by sequential allocation in a con-
ventional computer memory, viewed as a ID array of
cells.) The point of this sort of "natural" implemen-
tation of abstract arrays is that it can render certain
sorts of operation on the abstract information more
efficient or more convenient than they would other-
wise be.
There is one specific sub-proposal that much of
my project is concerned with: that £D "spatial" ar-
rays could be ........ ly mapped onto the neural arrays.
By a " 2D spatial" array I mean an abstract array in
which element (ij) is meant to correspond to position
(or subregion} (i j) in some 2D projection of space.
Thus, in a neural array that is being used to support
a spatial array, the element (ij) would correspond to
and hold information about position (id) of the 2D
projection of space.
Of course, having arrived at this point we ob-
serve that a neural array could be used to naturally
map an abstract 2D space as well as a geometric one.
Altogether, we are led to the following:.
pRINCIPLE 4
Relative position of activity-pattern occurrences
in a neural array may (from time to time} serve
to encode relative position in (geometric or ab-
stract) spaces.
This principle as stated is very general. One impor-
tant possibility that it allows is for spatial-analogue
representation to be mixed with other sorts of rep-
resentation in the very same neural array. Such hy-
brid types of representation are a major focus of my
project.
I view the range of possibilities allowed by Prin-
ciple 4 as constituting a neurally-explicated capability
for a form of imagery. I use the term "imagery" to link
the work to studies of imagery by psychologists and
philosophers [Refs. 3, 7, 10]. Imagery is held to con-
fer processing advantages in various sorts of mundane
cognition, including some types of problem solving,
although there has been much controversy over the
various claims made, and indeed over what imagery
is in the first place. On the other hand, although I
find it convenient to use the term "imagery" in talk-
ing about my model, I emphasize that I do not imply
that human beings have any conscious access to the
"images" I postulate. The images are simply a cer-
tain class of data structures, processsed in a certain
way.
THE SPECIFIC MODEL
I now sketch a particular, detailed model that instan-
tiates the data structuring principles presented in the
previous section. A longer discussion is provided else-
where [Ref. 2].
The role that this particular instantiation of the
principles plays in the research should be carefully
understood. I view it as just one of the many con-
ceivable detailed models that conform to the general
principles. It is this class of models that is my real
interest. Thus, it is possible that the present detailed
model may later be overthrown in favour of another.
In any case, the present model contains several delib-
erate over-simplifications.
The instantiation takes the form of an information-
processing model specified at a level slightly above
that of detailed circuitry. That is, the model is com-
posed of building blocks that can clearly be given a
straightforward implementation in terms of idealized
neurons that typically act like logic gates.
The model is based on a set of neural arrays of the
sort described above. I henceforth call them configu-
ration matrices (CMs). A short-term data structure
is set up by putting appropriate CM elements into
appropriate activity states {and letting the others be
in a "null" or "resting" state}. The elements used in
a data structure need not all be in the same CM.
Structure per se consists partly in the relative
positioning within individual CMs of the CM-element
states. {See Principle 2.} This form of structure is
backed up by a version of Principle 3: if two CM
elements are in states that are similar in a certain
way then they are taken to be identified with each
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other;, that is, certain processing mechanisms treat
them as if they were the same element.
A CM is laid out on the cortical surface as a
geometrical 2D array, at least approximately. Each
of the CM elements composing a CM is connected to
its eight neighbors, to enable certain basic processing
operations. The fact that the theory proposes several
CMs rather than iust one larger one reflects a concern
with physiological plausibility, but there is no space
here to go into this matter.
The total set of configuration matrices is divided
into a small set of "principal CMs" and a possibly
large set of %'torage CMs _. The activity configura-
tions (i.e. implemented data structures} in the prin-
cipal CMs can be acted on by condition-action rules.
These rules are implemented in neural circuitry that
is for the most part outside the CMs themselves but is
also dependent on connections between CM elements.
Rules do such things as responding to, analyzing and
modifying the data structures in principal CMs, copy-
ing them into and out of storage CMs, organizing
transfers of information between CMs and long-term
memory, and sending signals to mechanisms external
to the CM model itself.
I emphasize that the data structures in CM8 are
short-term. They are constantly being modified, in
the service of cognitive tasks such as language pro-
cessing, commonsense problem-solving, planning and
so on. The nature of long-term memory in the theory
will only be investigated at a late stage in the project.
(I certainly do not assume that a long-term encoding
of a CM activity-configuration is itself a pattern of
neural activity.}
The state of a CM element at any moment t is an
ordered pair (Bt, Ht). The component Bt is one out
of a finite set of values called "basic symbols". This
set of possibilities is the same for every CM element.
Any number of CM elements can simultaneously have
the same Bt value.
Most basic symbols will, at least in the initial
stages of the project, be neural activity patterns that
are internal "names" for entities such as particular
people, classes of objects (e.g. the class of all tables},
classes of situations or events, etc. When a CM ele-
ment holds such a basic symbol then we regard the
element as (currently} representing the entity named
by the symbol.
The Ht component of a CM element's state is an
ordered tuple of ON/OFF flag values. For intuitive
convenience, each tuple position is identified by the
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name of a color. When, say, the "red" position con-
tains the value ON we say that the CM element is
{currently} "highlighted in red", or just "red".
Data structures are created by placing partic-
ular basic symbols in various CM elements and/or
by putting CM elements into particular highlighting
states. The absolute positions of basic symbols and
highlighting states in a CM are irrelevant in the case
of data structures with no spatial-analogue aspect --
only the relative postioning is significant. For the
purposes of illustration, suppose there is a basic sym-
bol that is the internal neural "name" for a partic-
ulax person Mary. Let us refer to this basic symbol
as MARY. Similarly, suppose there is a basic symbol
JOHN for a particular person John, and a basic sym-
bol LOVE that is the internal name for the class of
possible loving situations. Then the statement that
John loves Mary can be encoded by means of the CM





Figure 1: John loves Mary.
The figure is to be understood as follows. It illustrates
an 8 by 8 region within a CM. Squares illustrate CM
cells. {The illustration is schematic: CM cells axe
not meant to be geometrically square regions of cor-
tex.) Capitalized words inside the squares illustrate
basic symbols, the black disc illustrates highlighting
in black, the empty circle illustrates highlighting in
white, and 'r' and 'g' in circles illustrate red and green
highlighting respectively. Squares with no basic sym-
bol shown illustrate cells containing a special NULL
basic symbol that does not represent anything. Ba-
sic symbols JOHN and MARY represent the people
John and Mary, and basic symbol LOVE represents
the "love" situation-class. The highlighting serves to
distinguish the roles of adjacent CM cells with respect
to each other. White and black highlighting are con-
fined to the special use illustrated here: a white CM
cell represents a member of the class represented by
the adjacent black CM cell. Therefore the white cell
in the Figure represents an individual love situation,
and is the "head" cell of the statement. In a love
statement the agent and object cells (those contain-
ing JOHN and MARY here) must be highlighted in
red and green respectively to indicate their particular
roles.
The most important thing to notice about the ex-
ample is the use of adjacency between CM elements
as the "glue" sticking components of a data structure
together. The particular relative positioning of CM
states is unimportant except in so far as the appropri-
ate adjacency relationships are achieved. Note that
adjacency includes diagonal adjacency.
More complex data structures are built up in
much the same way, as shown elsewhere [Ref. 2].
However, the representation method as so far pre-
sented suffers from an overcrowding problem. Most
obviously, the method as it stands cannot handle an
n-ary predication for n > 7, rather than a binary pred-
ication (using "loves", say}. The overcrowding prob-
lem is avoided by the use of "unassigned symbols",
a special type of basic symbol. An unassigned sym-
bol does not permanently name anything. Rather, a
CM element containing such a symbol can temporar-
ily name something by virtue of that element's current
role in a data structure. The crucial point is that if
any two CM elements contain the same symbol, then
they are in a sense identified with each other. Roughly
this means that the two elements both currently rep-
resent the same thing. Therefore, data structures can
be split up into sub-configurations.
The technique is illustrated in Figure 2, showing
how the information that John loves Mary or Mary
loves John could be encoded. In this figure the letters
'k' and 'r indicate unassigned symbols, temporarily
naming the hypothetical love situations. The OR sub-
configuration uses those unassigned symbols, thereby
referring to the same love situations. The 'p' in circles
indicates purple highlighting.
The sharing of symbols by CM elements consti-
tutes the model's instantiation of Principle 3 above.
Two elements are in a "similar" state just when they
contain the same basic symbol, and the "association"
involving them consists in their being identified with
each other. It is only fair to mention that similarity
association, although perhaps conceptually elegant as
a representational technique, introduces some extra
complexity and inemciency into the processing mech-
anisms.
Logical quantification can be handled straightfor-
wardly, by means of activity configurations that are
analogous to quantified formulae in first-order logic.
However, I am not happy about proposing brain data
structures that are similar in this way to logic for-
mulae. I am interested in the possibility of including
more ad hoc or naive quantificatioaal machinery. I














Figure 2: Structure splitting.
An Important Caveat
•My interest is more on how the representational Prin-
ciples enunciated above can be used to effect data
structuring than in what the content of the data struc_
tures is. Thus, data structures and rules of the type
illustrated in this section are merely being used for
intuitive convenience° I am not committed to the
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data structures and rules being at just this conceptua_
level in the brain. For instance, it may be that state-
ments would be broken down into lower-level concep-
tual primitives. Nor am I committed to the (abstract-
symbolic) data structures being closely analogous to
logical formulae, as they are in the present model.
Some Parameters
The project takes CMs to be of size 32 by 32. This size
fits well with my conjecture that each CM element is
implemented in the brain as a "minicolumn" of cor-
tex [Ref. 9]. Minicolumns are claimed by some neu-
rophysiologists to be basic functional units of cortex.
There are about 1000 in each of the larger columns of
cortex (about lmm wide} that also seem to be impor-,
tant functional components. Thus, a CM of size 32 by
32 fits nicely into a large column. A minicolumn con-
tains about a hundred neurons, which is enough for
my" purposes, especially since a single neuron is itself
capable of complex switching behavior. (Real neurons
are much more complex than single logic gates.}
If there are basic symbols of the sort used in ex-
amples above, then there must be several thousand
of them {and an accordingly large number of loca-
tion matrices -- see below -- for each principal CM).
The simulations in the project will use an artificially
restricted set of basic symbols, numbering no more
than a hundred or two.
I conjecture that there are only a handful of prin-
cipal CMs in the brain, and the simulations will cer-
tainly not use more than a dozen or so. No a priori
limit to the number of storage CMs will be imposed.
Spatial and Diagramnmtic Imagery
Line-of-Sight Tasks -- In accordance with the
spatial-analogue Principle (number 4), I allow rela-
tive position of CM elements to be used temporarily
to represent relative positions in geometric spaces or
in abstract spaces. In particular, if both "spatial"
axe3 in a CM are taken as analogues of geometric
axes, then a CM configuration acts as a sort of "spa-
tial image".
Figure 3 depicts an example of a spatial image.
Such a data structure might be used in dealing with
a task mentioned by Sloman [Ref. 12] -- determin-
ing whether some adversary A can see desired goal
object G, there being an obstacle that might block
A's line of vision. In the Figure, the 'G' and 'A' in-
dicate CM cells representing the goal object and the
adversary. The cells could contain basic symbols rep-
resenting those entities, or could be suitably qualified
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by abstract-symbolic structures in which the cells are
embedded {though none are shown in the Figure}.
The large blob illustrates an irregularly-shaped group
of orange-highlighted CM cells depicting the rough
shape of the obstacle. The crosses indicate a group
of gold-highlighted cells that are approximately in a
straight line. This group depicts the line of sight. No-
tice the use of highlighting to differentiate the iden-
tities of various entities. All the cells illustrated are
highlighted in blue as well. Certain processing rules
take the relative positions of blue cells (and only blue
cells) to indicate the relative spatial positions of the
represented objects. The obstructing of the line of
sight can be detected by a rule that responds to CM
elements that are highlighted in both gold and orange.
Figure 3: Line of sight.
The spatial problem-solving achievable with such
images is obviously of an approximate nature, but is
nevertheless heuristically useful. Elsewhere [Ref. 2]
I give the details of the processing of such an image.
Notice that the gold line represents a non-physical
object, but itself has the same spatial quality as the
blob representing the physical obstacle. This phe-
nomenon is part of the "diagrammatic" quality of the
system's imagery capability. Observe also the very
important point that the image could include abstract
statements about the entities involved. E.g. there
brain model than the standard logical forms of quan-
tification are.
RULES
We now turn to the way the rule mechanisms work.
Consider an inference rule that could be stated in
English as:
if a man loves a woman then the man is hungry
and assume that this rule is realized as a body R of
neural circuitry (mostly external to the CMs). Sup-
pose there is a principal CM holding a data structure
stating that man M loves a woman W. (Recall that
a principal CM is a CM whose contained data struc-'
tures can be manipulated by the rule mechanisms.)
To put it briefly, R detects the data structure by
means of suitable input taken direct from the CM
and indirectly from it via various "location matri-
ces _ (LMs). The detection is achieved by circuitry
that operates in parallel uniformly over the whole of
each LM or CM concerned. R then sends signals to
LMs and the CM that cause a piece of data struc-
ture stating the man is hungry to be inserted into the
CM. Once again, the signalling operates in parallel
over whole arrays. For instance, when signalling to
the CM, R sends the same signal simultaneously to
all CM elements. These then respond differently ac-
cording largely to their state of highlighting and the
highlighting states of their immediate neighbors.
In the following I discuss only the detection phase
of rule firing. The crucial feature of this phase is the
use of LMs. Consider a single principal CM. For each
ordinary basic symbol B there is a location matrix
LMv associated with the CM. This is a 2D neural ar-
ray isomorphic to the CM, although the LM elements
themselves are not isomorphic to CM elements. For
now we can assume that the state of an LM element is
just a single flag value. We say that the LM element
is on when the value of this flag is ON. The purpose of
LMv is to indicate the positions of those CM elements
that contain the symbol B. Specifically, a element in
LMB is ON when and only when the corresponding
CM element contains B.
If B is a symbol naming a class of entities, then
there is a member location matrix MLMB as well as
the matrix LMv. The task of MLMv is to indicate
the positions of members of the class. For instance,
the basic symbol LOVE used earlier names the class of
conceivable loving situations. Elements that are on in
LM_ovE indicate the positions in the CM of occur-
rences of the LOVE symbol itself. On the other hand,
elements that are on in MLMLovE indicate the posi-
tions of elements in the CM which explicitly represent
individual loving situations currently. The most im-
portant case of such a element _s a "love-proposition
head element" -- that is, a white-highlighted element
which is next to a black-highlighted element contain-
ing LOVE (cf. previous Figures). Another case is
when a CM element contains an unassigned symbol
that is also sitting in a love-proposition head element,
for then the two elements represent the same loving
situation.
Similarly, the task of MLMMsN is to indicate
the positions of CM elements that represent indi-
vidual men. This works analogously to the LOVE
case, since a white element next to a black element
containing MEN represents some man. Of course, a
CM element might contain the basic symbol JOHN,
where John is a man. Thus, whenever an element in
LMIOHN is turned ON the corresponding element in
MLMMsN is also turned on (if it is not already on).
Similarly, whenever a element in MLMMEN is turned
on the corresponding element in MLMpERsoNs is
also turned on.
The example rule mentioned above requires a fur-
ther location matrix, to indicate the positions of CM
elements representing man-loves-woman situations.
This matrix is described elsewhere [Ref. 2]. Notice
that it is needed only because some rule needs to de-
tect man-loves-woman situations. No location matrix
is necessary unless it forms part of the machinery for
some rule.
Similarity-association or symbol-sharing is given
computational flesh by LMs. The basic idea is that
whenever element (x,y) of a given LM is ON and
the corresponding element of the CM contains a non-
null symbol B, we want the system to turn ON every
other element (x',y') (in that LM) such that element
(x',y') in the CM also contains B. This effect is just
what is required for symbol-sharing to be taken as
CM-element identification. In fact, to facilitate the
process I take each LM element to contain the basic
symbol that is in the corresponding CM element. The
required spread of ONness in an LM is achieved by
each ON element in the LM broadcasting its symbol
to all other elements in the LM, and every element
then turning ON if its own symbol is the same as the
one broadcast.
Without special assumptions this broadcasting
must be done separately for every different symbol
represented in the LM, but if in fact the symbols are
nearly-orthogonal vectors of neural activity then it
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might be a statement to the effect that the adver-
sary is afraid of "us" (the agent doing the problem
solving). This ability to mix spatial and non-spatial
data structures is another aspect of the diagrammatic
quality of the system.
The rules that operate on the spatial image in
the line-of-sight task rely predominantly on primi-
tive signalling mechanisms that are much the same
as those required in any case by non-spatial-analogue,
abstract-symbolic processing. This point is an impor-
tant aspect of the fact that the theory puts spatial im-
agery and abstract-symbolic processing into a unified
framework.
3ohnson-Laird's Mental Models -- Johnson-Laird
has devoted much attention to human reasoning
about physical arrangements of objects [Ref. 5]. In a
simple case, a subject is told that the fork is to the
left of the spoon and that the knife is to the left of
the fork, and the subject must infer or verify that the
knife is to the left of the spoon. Johnson-Laird main-
tains that the subject constructs not only some inter-
nal propositional representations of the given pieces
of information (these representations being of a form
close to the linguistic statements themselves} but also
a "spat£almental model" of the situation. This
model consists of some sort of internal map-like rep-
resentation of space: tokens standing for the various
objects in the task are placed in particular positions
in the map, the positions being consistent with what
the propositional representations say. The desired re-
lationships can then be read off the map directly.
The present projectwill provide a rather di-
rectneural implementation of Johnson-Lalrd'smod-
els.That is,ina CM being used as a space map, ele-
ments can be made torepresentparticularobjectsby
means ofthe data structuringtechniquesalludedtoin
the previoussection.These elements would be in rel-
ativepositionsinthe CM that correspond to the rel-
ativepositions of the object relationships as specified
in the task statement. See Figure 4. The three white
cells represent a knife, a fork and a spoon. These cells
are also blue, to indicate that their relative positions
have spatial significance. For illustrative convenience,
leftness/rightness in the CM illustration in the Figure
corresponds to leftness/rightness in physical space.
In fact, an important feature of Johnson-Laird's
total theory is that mental models are constructed
from propositional (abstract-symbolic) representa-
tions that state the object relationships in the case at
hand. His propositional representations would have
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an analogue in my system, in the form of abstract-
symbolic data structures in various CMs. "A is to the
left of B" can of course be represented in the system
in a way similar to the way "John loves Mary" is rep-
resented. These data structures will be used as a basis
for constructing the diagrammatic spatial images that
display the relative positions. The construction will





Figure 4: An implemented mental model.
For various reasons, Johnson-Laird suggests that
some spat£al mental models may contain simple
symbolic devices of a propositional nature as well as
the devices already illustrated. The CM theory is well
set up to handle this sort of mixture, since it is already
geared to hybrid, diagrammatic imagery as well as
simple spatial imagery and purely propositional data
structures.
The project will give precise computational sub-
stance to another major aspect of Johnson-Laird's
ideas. This is the issue of syllogistic reasoning.
Johnson-Laird proposes the use of another class of
mental models to cope with such reasoning. This
class is easily encompassed in my model. The syllogis-
tic mental models involve certain restricted forms of
quantification that are arguably more plausible for a
turns out that the treatment of all the different sym°
bois can proceed in parallel. I am investigating means
for achieving this near-orthogonality.
Interpreted Rules
There is a major disadvantage to the hardware im-
plementation of rules of the sort assumed above. The
rules themselves are not data structures that can be
inspected and manipulated {in the service, say, of
rule learning and modification). A major task of the
project will be to investigate the possibility of rules in
the form of data structures. That is, to continue the
example used earlier, the rule "if a man loves a woman
then the man is hungry" would be a data structure
of some form in a CM. The hardware rule mechanism,
would then consist partially or wholly of rules that
act together as an interpreter of the data structure
rules.
The ideas on interpreted rules are less fully devel-
oped than are other aspects of the model. A detailed
syntax of data structure rules remains to be fully de-
fined, and the nature of the pattern matching pro-
cess required for rule enabling is not yet completely
worked out. I anticipate that this process will oper-
ate largely by the flow of simple signals among CM
elements.
MPP SIMULATION
An MPP Pascal simulation program for a small pi-
lot version of the model is running. In this version
there is just one CM, 20 basic symbols (the location-
unspecific neural activity patterns that can be instan-
tiated in CM elements}, 5 highlighting colours, 2 very
simple rules, and 22 LMs (the location matrices sub-
serving the rules}. Later simulations of the model will
involve a hundred or two basic symbols, a dozen or so
highlighting colours, a few principal CMs, dozens of
storage CMs, dozens of rules per principal CM, and
several hundred LMs per principal CM.
The current level of simulation is above that of
detailed neural circuitry, so that for instance a basic
symbol is simply simulated at present by a integer
value. The highlighting flags at each CM element are
simulated by boolean values. The ON/OFF state of
an LM element is also simulated by a boolean value.
Accordingly, the CM is simulated by {1} a paral-
lel array of integers (in a subrange} and (2) for each
highlighting colour, a parallel array of booleans. Each
LM is simulated by a parallel array of booleans. All
these arrays are simultaneously present in the ARU.
Since in the model each CM and LM is of size only 32
by 32, only parallel subscripts in the range 0..31 have
significance currently.
After the initial state of the CM has been set up
from input data, the simulation proceeds cyclically.
Each cycle consists of (a) redefining the state of every
LM, (b) firing one rule {if any can be fired at all),
thus usually altering the state of the CM. The cycling
stops when either no rule can fire or an input-specified
number of cycles has been performed.
The neural model itself relies mostly on uniform,
local, parallel operations over any given matrix (i.e.
a given operation involves all elements of a matrix
simultaneously, the processing at the elements vary-
ing only according to their own current states and
their neighbors' current states). Therefore, most of
the programming of the LM-state updates and rule-
firing is straightforward, and makes good use of the
ARU's SIMD nature and of MPP Pascal's parallel-
array features. A certain amount of array shifting is
needed in those cases when the processing at a matrix
element brings in the neighboring elements.
In later model versions, there will be several
CMs, and more than one will be "principal" (i.e. as-
sociated with rule machinery). Since there will be sig-
nificantly many periods during the model's processing
when various different principal CMs (and attendant
LMs) are being similarly processed, and since it is un-
likely that any model version will contain more than
16 principal CMs, it will be convenient to simulate the
principal CMs by using different 32 by 32 portions of
the ARU {with the LMs attached to a given CM us-
ing the same ARU portion as that CM). Thus various
principal CMs will be able to be operated on simul-
taneously. However, the arrangement will complicate
the programming of the frequently needed copying of
the contents of one principal CM into another princi-
pal CM.
Storage CMs, on the other hand, can be conve-
niently stacked vertically beneath principal CMs, as
there would be little benefit in arranging them hor-
izontally across the CM, and they do not have any
associated LMs.
LM Paging
In later versions of the model, each LM element will
have a few flags in addition to the single on/off state
mentioned earlier. These flags and the state will be
simulated by booleans. Now, in the model, each LM
element will also contain a copy of the basic sym-
bol in the corresponding element of the CM to which
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that LM is associated. However, it turns out that
my current hypotheses about the use of these symbol
copies are such that there will be no need to carry
the duplication over into the simulation itself. Thus,
it will be adequate to go on implementing each LM as
a small set of boolean parallel arrays. Nevertheless,
since large versions of the model will contain several
hundred LMs for each principal CM, the memory ca-
pacity of the PEa in the ARU will be too small to
hold all the LMs. A scheme will be needed for paging
LMs to and from the staging memory°
A Snag
To oversimplify a little, l would have liked to use the
following piece of program to do some basic LM up-
dating. (Type symbols is a subrange of I_ids, which
is itself a subrange of integer.}
(. elq_syabols: parallel array[0..127,0..127]
of symbols ;
L_4: parallel array[Llqids,0.. 127,0.. 127]
of boolean ;
*)
where C]q_symbols o null_symbol
do I_4[CN_syabols] := true
That is, the desired action was:
for each i,j where e/,l_syabols [i, J ] o null_nyabol,
set LM[G_4_symbols[i,J], i,J] to true.
Unfortunately, albeit understandably, neither the
hardware nor MPP Pascal supports this "indirect ad-
dressing" at PEa. Therefore, I have had to resort to a
loop that cycles through the (non-null} symbols, using
a control variable s, doing
L_4[s] := (Cl__syabols = s)
at each stage. This loss of parallelism will not have
a drastic effect on my own simulation work, but the
phenomenon is of some general interest. Goodyear
Aerospace's Dr. Ken Batcher, designer of the MPP,
suggested indirect addressing at PEs as an important
addition in future versions of the machine, in his in-
vited speech during the Symposium. It is also note-
worthy that he appealed specifically to artificial intel-




On short-term information-processing in connec-
tionist theories. Cognition and Brain Theory, 7
(1), 1984.
2. Barnden, J.A. Diagrammatic short-term infor-
mation processing by neural mechanisms. Cogni-
tion and Brain Theory, 7 (3&4), 285-328, 1984.
3. Block, N. (Ed). Imagery. Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press, 1981.
4. Hinton, G.E. & Anderson, J.A. (eds) Parallel
models of associative memory. Hiilsdale, N J:
Lawrence Erlbaum, 1981.
5. Johnson-Laird, P.N. Mental models. Harvard
University Press: Cambridge, Mass. 1983.
6. Kohonen, T. Self-organization and a.,,sociative
memory. Springer-Verlag: Berlin, 1984.
7. Kolers, P.A. Perception and representation. Ann.
Revw. Psychol. 84, 129-66, 19&3.
8. McClelland, J.L., Rumelhart, D.E. and the PDP
Research Group. Parallel distributed processing,
Vol. 1: Foundations. MIT Press: Cambridge,
Mass. 1986.
9. Mounteastle, V.B. An organizing principle for
cerebral function: the unit module and the dis-
tributed system. In G.M. Edehnan & V.B.
Mountcastle, The mindful brain. MIT Press:
Cambridge, Mass. 1978.
10. Richardson, J.T.E. Mental imagery and human
memory. St. Martin's Press: NY. 1980.
11. Rumelhart, D.E., McClelland, J.L. and the PDP
Research Group. Parallel distributed processing,
Vol. e: Psychological and biological models. MIT
Press: Cambridge, Mass. 1986.
12. Sloman, A. Image interpretation: the way ahead?
In O.J. Braddick & A.C. Sleigh (eds), Physical
and biological processing of images.
Springer-Verlag: Berlin, 1983.
13. Touretzky, D.S. & Hintonr G.E. Symbols among
the neurons: details of a connectionist inference
architecture. Procs. gth Int. Joint Conf. on
Artificial Intelligence, 1985.
14. Papers in Cognitive Science, g {1), 1985: special
issue on connectionism.
68
